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FISHER’S FISHING EXPEDITION 
Vinay Harpalani ∗ 
On October 10, 2012, I attended the U.S. Supreme Court oral ar-
guments in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,1 the much anticipated 
case about race-conscious undergraduate admissions at the University 
of Texas at Austin (UT).  Abigail Fisher claims that she was treated 
unfairly in UT’s admissions process, because UT employs a race-
conscious holistic admissions policy to admit a small percentage of its 
undergraduate entering class, in addition to the 80 percent that is au-
tomatically admitted via the Top Ten Percent Law.2  Fisher’s conten-
tion is not that she would have been admitted but for the race-
conscious policy, but rather that the Top Ten Percent Law itself gen-
erates a “critical mass” of minority students—thus precluding UT 
from using a race-conscious policy under Grutter v. Bollinger.3 
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 1 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, 644 
F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (No. 11-345).  Oral argu-
ments in Fisher occurred on October 10, 2012.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-345.pdf; Oral 
Argument, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345. 
 2 Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 51.803 (2009).  In 2011, the Top Ten Percent Law was amended 
“to cap the number of students guaranteed admission at UT Austin to 75% of the seats 
available to Texas residents.”  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 224 n.56.  In prior years, the Top Ten 
Percent Law had accounted for the admission of over 80 percent of UT undergraduates. 
 3 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that a school may use race in admissions decisions if 
the use is narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in creating a “critical mass” of 
minority students to obtain the benefits of a diverse student body). 
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Building on my observations and my recent article in the University 
of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law,4 this Essay examines the 
Fisher oral argument, focusing on two important issues: the meaning 
of “critical mass” and the quest for race neutrality in admissions.  Ul-
timately, this Essay argues that Fisher is a fishing expedition, because 
neither of these issues is resolvable, or even needs to be resolved to 
decide the case. 
The question of what constitutes a “critical mass” of minority stu-
dents came up several times during the Fisher oral arguments.  Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor first asked Bert Rein, Plaintiffs’ counsel, “[C]ould 
you tell me what a critical mass was?”5  Mr. Rein responded that the 
question to consider when determining if a critical mass exists is 
whether underrepresented minority students are “isolated. . . . [and] 
unable to speak out[.]”6  Further, Mr. Rein argued that as a predicate, 
Grutter requires “a range, a view as to what would be an appropriate 
level of comfort, critical mass . . . [which] . . . allows you to evaluate” 
whether race-conscious policies are still necessary.7  To support the 
Plaintiffs’ argument that UT had attained a critical mass with the Top 
Ten Percent Law alone, Mr. Rein emphasized the “21 percent admis-
sion percentage of . . . underrepresented minorities”8 at UT in 2004 
(the last year before the race-conscious policy was implemented)—
implying that this was sufficient for a critical mass.  Thus, the Plain-
tiffs argued that critical mass can be defined by the combined per-
 
 4 Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious 
Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463 (2012).  This article was cited in the Society of 
American Law Teachers (S.A.L.T.) amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Fisher.  See 
Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 
14, 22–23, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012), 2012 
WL 3418833. 
 5 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=693/697.  
Justice Samuel Alito also asked Mr. Rein, Plaintiffs’ counsel, “[D]o you understand what 
the University of Texas thinks is the definition of a critical mass?  Because I don’t.”  Id. at 
20, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=1114/1120. 
 6 See id. at 15, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=808/826; see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319 (not-
ing that at the trial phase, Dean Jeffrey Lehman of the University of Michigan Law School 
testified that “critical mass means numbers such that underrepresented minority students 
do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”). 
 7 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1059/1070. 
 8 Id. at 15–16, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=825/844. 
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centage of Black and Latina/o students in an entering class.9  They 
also contended that specific numerical criteria for critical mass, such 
as a range or target enrollment where minority students are no long-
er isolated,10 should be defined ex ante by the University.11  Mr. Rein 
stated that lack of such criteria for critical mass was “a flaw 
in . . . Grutter,”12 and he asked the Court to require criteria for critical 
mass.13  These criteria would presumably be subject to judicial review 
to determine whether race-conscious policies were necessary to attain 
that target.14  However, when Justice Sotomayor pressed Mr. Rein on 
the “standard of critical mass” and asked him what “fixed number” 
would be sufficient, Mr. Rein replied only that it was “not [the Plain-
tiffs’] burden to establish the number.”15 
Chief Justice Roberts essentially asked the same question of UT’s 
counsel, Gregory Garre: “when will we know that you’ve reached a 
critical mass?”16  Mr. Garre responded that “we look to feedback di-
rectly from students about racial isolation that they experience.  Do 
they feel like spokespersons for their race.”17  On the surface, Mr. 
Garre’s response was similar to that of Mr. Rein: both implied that a 
critical mass would be present when minority students no longer felt 
isolated.  However, the parties disagreed sharply on how to determine 
whether minority students feel isolated.  In contrast to the pre-
determined numerical range/target advocated by Mr. Rein and the 
Plaintiffs, Mr. Garre argued for a holistic set of criteria with no specif-
ic ex ante goal: “feedback [via surveys] directly from students about 
racial isolation that they experience,”18 “enrollment data, . . . . 
[d]iversity in the classroom[,] . . . [and] the racial climate on cam-
 
 9 See id.; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 2011).  This 
approach ignores other minority groups such as Native Americans.  See Harpalani, supra 
note 4, at 514–15. 
 10 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13. 
 11 See id. at 19.  Justice Sotomayor compared this to a quota, and in response, Mr. Rein tried 
to distinguish between a “quota” and an “operative . . . range.”  Id., audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1069/1075. 
 12 Id. at 13, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=664/671. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 16–17, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=892/920.  Justice Sotomayor used the term “fixed number” 
to illustrate how the Plaintiffs’ view of “critical mass” is similar to a quota.  See infra note 
24 and accompanying text. 
 16 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 45–46, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2649/2660. 
 17 Id. at 46, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2698/2699. 
 18 Id. 
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pus.”19  Based on these criteria, Mr. Garre argued that both universi-
ties and courts could review ex post whether a critical mass of minori-
ty students had been attained.20 
Both of these positions show the flaws in defining “critical mass” 
primarily by whether minority students encounter feelings of isola-
tion and tokenism,21 and in using critical mass as a test for whether 
race-conscious admissions are permissible.22  It is difficult to under-
stand the Plaintiffs’ view of critical mass as “a range” in terms other 
than a numerical goal/target (even if it is a flexible one).  Grutter pro-
scribed such numerical goals,23 and Justice Sotomayor recognized this 
when she said to Mr. Rein: “[b]oy, it sounds awfully like a quota to 
me that Grutter said you should not be doing, that you shouldn’t be 
setting goals, that you shouldn’t be setting quotas.”24  Although the 
other Justices did not seem to be bothered by this,25 the Plaintiffs’ po-
sition on critical mass is inconsistent with Grutter and Bakke.26  Moreo-
ver, how would a university know ex ante whether any number or 
percentage of minority students would mitigate feelings of isolation 
on campus?  Feelings of isolation and tokenism are not just contin-
gent on minority student numbers; student support resources, minor-
ity faculty and staff mentors, and many other factors contribute to 
whether minority students “feel isolated or like spokespersons for 
their race.”27 
 
 19 Id. at 48. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 474–76. 
 22 See id. at 484–85. 
 23 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329–30 (2003) (noting that “[t]he Law School’s inter-
est is not simply ‘to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particu-
lar group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.’  That would amount to outright ra-
cial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional” (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))). 
 24 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 19, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1089/1103. 
 25 For example, Justice Anthony Kennedy later made a comment which assumed that UT 
could have “a numerical category a numerical standard [sic], a numerical designation for 
critical mass: It’s X percent.”  Id. at 52. 
 26 See supra note 23. 
 27 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.  See also, e.g., William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 
209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. (forthcoming) at 6, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2123653 (“The benefits associated with ‘critical mass’ are high-
ly context-dependent and not amenable to a one-size-fits-all admissions target, but these 
benefits are no less real and measurable because they are manifest in the complex ecosys-
tem of higher learning.”); Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical Analysis of a 
Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 1233 (2010) (acknowledging 
“the power of creating critical mass and a diverse classroom” but noting that “stigma and 
racism . . . were still present”); Tara J. Yosso et al., Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggres-
sions, and Campus Racial Climate for Latina/o Undergraduates, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 659, 660 
 
Feb. 2013] FISHER’S FISHING EXPEDITION 61 
UT’s view of critical mass is also problematic: it does not offer any 
concrete standard for when minority students no longer feel isolated, 
which could serve as a stopping point for race-conscious admissions.28  
Chief Justice Roberts pressed this point repeatedly,29 and Justice So-
tomayor also raised it.30  Mr. Garre only offered that critical mass is 
attained when “underrepresented minorities . . . do not feel like 
spokespersons for their race, . . . [where] an environment where 
cross-racial understanding is promoted, . . .[and] educational bene-
fits of diversity are realized”31—an explanation which did not appear 
to satisfy Chief Justice Roberts.32  Even if these criteria could be relia-
bly assessed,33 Mr. Garre did not suggest how universities or courts 
could determine whether race-conscious policies were still necessary 
to attain them.  It is likely that some percentage of minority students 
would “feel isolated and like spokespersons” for the foreseeable fu-
ture, even if minority enrollment increased significantly.34  Moreover, 
if, say in 2013, UT had reached a point where enough minority stu-
dents no longer felt isolated, it would still have done so in part by us-
ing race-conscious admissions policies.  Eliminating consideration of 
race might lead to a drop in minority student enrollment, such that 
minority students once again “feel isolated or like spokespersons.”35  
Thus, neither Mr. Rein nor Mr. Garre provided an answer to Chief 
 
(2009) (examining the ways in which Latinas/os respond to racial microaggressions and 
confront hostile campus racial climates). 
 28 For an elaboration of this critique, see Harpalani, supra note 4, at 510. 
 29 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 46–47, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2698/2699. 
 30 Id. at 48–49, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2790/2806. 
 31 Id. at 49, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2826/2853. 
 32 Id. at 46–47 (“[Y]ou conduct a survey and ask students if they feel racially isolat-
ed. . . . And that’s the basis for our Constitutional determination?”), audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2699/2708. 
 33 See William C. Kidder, The Salience of Racial Isolation: African Americans’ and Latinos’ Percep-
tions of Climate and Enrollment Choices With and Without Proposition 209, CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT AT UCLA, 13 (Oct. 9, 2012), http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-
access/affirmative-action/the-salience-of-racial-isolation-african-americans2019-and-
latinos2019-perceptions-of-climate-and-enrollment-choices-with-and-without-proposition-
209/Kidder_Racial-Isolation_CRP_final_Oct2012.pdf (“Notwithstanding the complexities 
of campus climate and critical mass, . . . data from leading research universities show that 
higher levels of racial diversity are generally better for the campus climate faced by Afri-
can American students, whereas racial isolation in combination with an affirmative action 
ban is associated with a more inhospitable racial climate.”); id. at 6 (“The data lend sup-
port to the concept of ‘critical mass’ while acknowledging that context matters and it is 
unrealistic to expect an across-the-board numerical definition of what constitutes suffi-
cient critical mass.”). 
 34 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 35 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003). 
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Justice Roberts’s and Justice Sotomayor’s questions about a stopping 
point for race-conscious admissions.  “Critical mass” cannot adequate-
ly provide such an answer.36 
The idea that critical mass entails “numbers such that underrepre-
sented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons 
for their race”37 derives from the University of Michigan’s argument 
during the trial phase of Grutter.38  However, while the Grutter majority 
cited this language, it further defined “critical mass” in functional 
terms, noting that “when a critical mass of underrepresented minori-
ty students is present, racial stereotypes lose their force because 
nonminority students learn there is no ‘minority viewpoint’ but ra-
ther a variety of viewpoints among minority students.”39  According to 
this view, critical mass involves having a “variety of viewpoints among 
minority students,”40 as such diversity within racial groups helps to 
break down racial stereotypes—and thus to actualize the educational 
benefits of diversity.41 
Unfortunately, UT did not raise the “diversity within racial 
groups” argument until its Supreme Court brief,42 and UT did not tie 
this argument directly to the concept of critical mass or to the com-
 
 36 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 484–85. 
 37 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319.  See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 474–75 n.34.  The Plaintiffs in 
Fisher also defined “critical mass” in similar terms.  See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
631 F.3d 213, 243 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Plaintiffs-Appellants contend that “the 
concept of critical mass is defined by the minimum threshold for minority students to 
have their ideas represented in class discussions and not to feel isolated or like spokesper-
sons for their race”); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
631 F.3d 213 (2009) (No. 09-50822) (arguing that “critical mass” is defined as “a sufficient 
number of underrepresented minority students such that such minority students would 
‘not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race’” (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318–
19)).  See also I. Bennett Capers, Flags, 48 HOW. L.J. 121, 122–23 (2004) (“[C]ritical mass 
implies a climate where one is neither conspicuous nor on display, where one does not 
feel the opprobrium of being a token, nor the burden of being the designated repre-
sentative for an entire group.  It also implies a climate where one can speak freely, where 
one not only has a voice, but a voice that will be heard.”). 
 38 See supra note 6. 
 39 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 319–20.  See also id. at 333 (“The Law School does not premise its need 
for critical mass on ‘any belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express 
some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’  To the contrary, diminishing the 
force of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law School’s mission, and one that 
it cannot accomplish with only token numbers of minority students.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Brief for Respondent Bollinger et al. at 30, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) (No. 02-241))). 
 40 Id. at 320. 
 41 See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 477–78. 
 42 See Brief of Respondents at 33, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (2012) (No. 
11-345), 2012 WL 3245488 (asserting that “[h]olistic review permits the consideration of 
diversity within racial groups”).  However, UT does not elaborate upon this idea or ana-
lyze it in any depth.  See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 505 n.183 and accompanying text. 
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pelling interest in Grutter.43  UT had already built its argument about 
critical mass around classroom isolation of minority students44: as a 
consequence, the reference to diversity within racial groups was cur-
sory and seemed like a last-minute addition.45  When Mr. Garre raised 
this reference in the Fisher oral argument, several of the Justices re-
torted sharply.  Mr. Garre argued that UT “would want representa-
tives and different viewpoints from individuals within the 
same . . . racial group,”46 such as “the minority candidate who has 
shown that . . . he or she has succeeded in an integrated environ-
ment.”47  Justice Samuel Alito replied that UT’s argument was essen-
tially that “[t]he top 10 percent plan . . . [is] faulty, because it doesn’t 
admit enough African Americans and Hispanics who come from priv-
ileged backgrounds.”48  And after Mr. Garre reiterated his point about 
the educational benefits of within-group diversity,49 Justice Anthony 
Kennedy—whose vote will likely be decisive in Fisher 50—seemed dis-
mayed that “what counts is race above all. . . . You want underprivi-
leged of a certain race and privileged of a certain race.  So that’s 
race.”51  Mr. Garre again noted that “it’s members of the same racial 
group . . . bringing different experiences,”52 but Justice Kennedy 
seemed unmoved.53 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. at 504–05. 
 45 See id. at 505 n.183 and accompanying text. 
 46 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 41, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2394/2411. 
 47 Id. at 42, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2426/2452.  See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 512–13 (not-
ing that the Top Ten Percent Law serves largely to admit Black and Latina/o students 
from highly segregated public schools). 
 48 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 43, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2502/2548. 
 49 Id. at 44 (noting that UT “want[s] minorities from different backgrounds”).  See also id. at 
45, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2563/2634 (noting that for “any racial group, . . . [UT] would want peo-
ple from different perspectives”). 
 50 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 464 n.3. 
 51 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 44, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2563/2634. 
 52 Id. at 45, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2563/2634. 
 53 I base this assertion on the comments noted in the text, on my observations during the 
oral argument, and on the audio clip of the oral argument, available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2563/2634.  
Also, in examining Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 782 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (concurring with majority in striking race-conscious 
school assignment plans, but noting that certain race-conscious strategies are permissi-
ble), Professor Reva Siegel argues that Justice Kennedy objects to “individualized racial 
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Solicitor General Donald Verrilli tried to reframe the argument 
about diversity within racial groups directly in terms of the educa-
tional benefits noted in Grutter, such as breaking down racial stereo-
types.  Mr. Verrilli argued that 
universities . . . are looking . . . not to grant a preference for privilege, but 
to make individualized decisions about applicants who will directly fur-
ther the education mission.  For example, they will look for individuals 
who will play against racial stereotypes . . . : [t]he African American fenc-
er; the Hispanic who has . . . mastered classical Greek.54 
However, neither Mr. Garre nor Mr. Verrilli tied these ideas directly 
to the notion of critical mass.  This link is clear in Grutter, which de-
fines “critical mass” in terms of the educational benefits of diversity 
(including within-group diversity), such as breaking down racial ste-
reotypes.55  Moreover, even the Plaintiffs’ and UT’s notion of critical 
mass—numbers such that minority students do not “feel isolated and 
like spokespersons for their race”56—is related to diversity within ra-
cial groups.  One possible reason to have a mix of minority students 
from high and low socioeconomic backgrounds is that the former, 
who have often attended predominantly White schools in affluent 
districts or elite, private schools, may help the latter adjust socially to 
elite, predominantly White universities.  This argument was raised by 
Shanta Driver, a lawyer for the student intervenors in Grutter, at a de-
bate on affirmative action shortly after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Grutter.57  In addition to their surveys on feelings of isolation, universi-
 
classification of applicants” which can “affront individual dignity and . . . exacerbate 
group division.”  Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1308 (2011).  Professor Siegel 
further contends that “[h]ad the school districts simply relied on race-conscious but fa-
cially neutral attendance zones to promote integration—rather than using race to evalu-
ate individual student applications to magnet schools—Justice Kennedy emphasizes that 
he would have upheld the policy.”  Id.  But see Heather Gerken, Justice Kennedy and the Do-
mains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REV. 104, 117 (2007) (observing that in Parents In-
volved, “Justice Kennedy . . . makes a remarkably similar argument [to Justice O’Connor’s 
argument in Grutter], even observing that public schools could use a Grutter-like admis-
sions policy as a last resort”); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797–98 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[A] district may consider it a com-
pelling interest to achieve a diverse student population.  Race may be one component of 
that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs, should also 
be considered.”). 
 54 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 60, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=3448/3464. 
 55 See supra notes 39–41 and accompanying text. 
 56 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319 (2003).  See also supra notes 6, 17 and accompany-
ing text. 
 57 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 513 n.226.  I was in attendance at the debate which includ-
ed Ms. Driver.  She was asked why affirmative action is justified if it primarily benefits 
more privileged minorities.  Ms. Driver responded by stating that at the University of 
Michigan, about one-half of the Black undergraduate students come from relatively privi-
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ties would be wise to investigate whether such intragroup social sup-
port does occur, and whether diversity within racial groups helps to 
ensure that minority students adjust well and do not feel isolated.  
Universities can use such data to bolster arguments for race-conscious 
admissions policies.58 
There were a few other points raised with respect to critical mass, 
none of which clarified the concept any further.  When Mr. Rein stat-
ed that the Plaintiffs “don’t believe that demographics [of the state of 
Texas] are the key to . . . critical mass,”59 Justice Sotomayor retorted 
that the Plaintiffs “can’t seriously suggest that demographics aren’t a 
factor to be looked at” in conjunction with feelings of isolation 
among minority students.60  But Justice Antonin Scalia suggested oth-
erwise, noting that the “right” position in his view is “that the demo-
graphic makeup of the State has nothing to do with whether some-
body feels isolated . . . in a State that is only 1 percent Black that 
doesn’t mean [Black students are] not isolated so long as there’s 1 
percent in the class.”61  Ironically, UT seemed to agree with Justice 
Scalia, and with Mr. Rein and the Plaintiffs.  When Justice Alito asked 
Mr. Garre if “the critical mass for the University of Texas [is] de-
pendent on the breakdown of the population of Texas,”62 Mr. Garre 
replied “[n]o, it’s not at all. . . . It’s looking to the educational bene-
fits of diversity on campus.”63  Mr. Garre tried to frame this answer as 
a point that he and Mr. Rein “actually agree on”64—but neither of 
them defined these educational benefits in any tangible sense. 
Justice Alito also asked Mr. Garre whether critical mass could “vary 
from group to group”65 and “from State to State”66—to which UT’s 
 
leged families, while the other half come from inner-city Detroit, and that the “reason 
[Black students from the inner-city] survive on campus is because of the [more privileged 
Black students].”  I cannot verify the numbers or the assertion by Ms. Driver, but it is a 
well-founded hypothesis and worthy of more investigation. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/
cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=728/734. 
 60 Id., audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=741/742. 
 61 Id. at 15, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=772/794; see also id. at 48, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2760/2769 
(Justice Alito asking Mr. Garre “would 3 percent [black student population] be enough in 
New Mexico . . . where the African American population is around 2 percent?”). 
 62 Id. at 40, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2287/2332. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 39, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=2287/2332. 
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counsel replied that “[i]t certainly is contextual” and “it could vary.”67  
But this also did not clarify the concept further. 
In the end, Justice Scalia’s comment that “[w]e should probably 
stop calling it critical mass . . . .  Call it a cloud or something like that” 
resonated the most.68  Although my view of Fisher and race-conscious 
admissions is quite different from Justice Scalia’s view, I do agree with 
him that Fisher’s search for “critical mass” is a fishing expedition. 
Nevertheless, defining “critical mass” is not necessary to resolve 
Fisher.  The Supreme Court could resolve the case by focusing directly 
on the educational benefits of diversity (and specifically on diversity 
within racial groups), rather than on the presence or absence of a 
critical mass.  The Court could require UT to demonstrate that its 
race-conscious policy contributes to the educational benefits of diver-
sity above and beyond the Top Ten Percent Law, by facilitating ad-
mission of students who are different in some meaningful way.69  UT 
might do this by showing that its race-conscious policy allows admis-
sion of Black and Latina/o students from different socioeconomic 
backgrounds (who have different viewpoints and experiences from 
those admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law),70 or minority stu-
dents in different majors,71 or perhaps a different group of minority 
students, such as Native Americans.72  If UT could not demonstrate 
satisfactorily that its race-conscious policy does indeed make such a 
“unique contribution to diversity,”73 then the policy would no longer 
be constitutional.  Thus, this approach offers the stopping point for 
race-conscious admissions policies that the Justices were searching for 
during oral arguments.74  Moreover, by employing such a “unique 
contribution to diversity” test, the stopping point would be directly 
contingent on the success of the policy in contributing to the educa-
tional benefits of diversity, not on some numerically or contextually 
vague definition of “critical mass.” 
 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.  See also Harpalani, supra note 4, at 479–83 (discussing reasons why “critical mass” may 
vary from group to group). 
 68 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 70–71, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=4060/4085.  
The courtroom erupted in laughter after Justice Scalia made this statement.  Id. 
 69 Harpalani, supra note 4, at 523–26. 
 70 Id. at 525. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 524. 
 73 Id. at 523. 
 74 See id. at 526. 
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Of course, this leaves open another question: how much diversity 
is enough?75  A university can always admit different students to in-
crease the overall diversity of its student body, and Grutter stated that 
race-conscious policies should be phased out eventually.  But UT’s 
race-conscious policy is already much more modest than the Universi-
ty of Michigan School of Law’s policy in Grutter.76  In that sense, UT is 
much further along in phasing out the use of race than most universi-
ties (which do not have a Top Ten Percent Law to help diversify the 
student body), and the Court should recognize this. 
In fact, in their Supreme Court brief, the Fisher Plaintiffs even ar-
gued that race was too small of a factor for UT’s policy to be constitu-
tional.77  At oral argument, Justice Kennedy first questioned this log-
ic,78 and then suggested that the rationale for this argument might be 
that UT “shouldn’t impose this hurt or this injury [of using 
 
 75 A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this Essay.  However, I consider it in 
greater depth in my prior Article.  See id. at 527–30. 
 76 See Brief of Appellees at 18, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011) 
(No. 09-50822), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/Fisher.v.St.o.Tx-
Appellees.Brief.pdf (noting that “UT’s holistic consideration of race is even more modest 
than the policy upheld in Grutter”).  At oral argument, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg also 
noted that UT’s race-conscious policy is “more modest” than the policy upheld “in Grut-
ter.”  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 10, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=440/458; see 
also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 608 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (noting 
that “UT considers race in its admissions process as a factor of a factor of a factor of a fac-
tor”). 
 77 See Brief for Petitioner at 38, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. filed May 
21, 2012), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/
Fisher%27s%20Merits%20Brief%205%2021%202012.pdf (arguing that “where racial 
classifications have only a ‘minimal impact’ in pursuing a compelling interest, it ‘casts 
doubt on the necessity of using racial classifications’ in the first instance” (citing Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734 (2007); id. at 790 
(Kennedy, J., concurring))); see also Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don’t Tell, Don’t Ask: Nar-
row Tailoring After Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 523 n.27 (2007) (“At least as a 
theoretical matter, narrow tailoring requires not only that preferences not be too large, 
but also that they not be too small so as to fail to achieve the goals of the relevant compel-
ling government interest.”).  But see Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311, 532–33 (ex-
plaining how even a small number of minority students could have a meaningful impact 
on educational benefits of diversity). 
 78 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=1266/1341 
(Justice Kennedy asking Plaintiff’s counsel “what’s the problem” with “the University’s 
race-conscious admission plan . . . admit[ting] . . . so few minorities” and noting that he 
“had trouble with that [argument] reading the brief”).  Justice Ginsburg asked a similar 
question of Mr. Garre.  See id. at 50, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2898/2922 (asking UT’s counsel if “the game is 
just too small to warrant using a racial criteria”). 
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race] . . . for so little benefit,”79 and Mr. Rein agreed.80  However, 
there are several problems with this reasoning. 
First, nothing in Grutter suggests that a race-conscious policy can 
be too small to be constitutional: in fact, Grutter implies the opposite 
with its sunset principle81 for such policies.  Universities cannot elimi-
nate race-conscious policies all at once, when some magic “critical 
mass” is obtained.82  Rather, Grutter contemplates that universities will 
gradually phase out race-conscious policies and use race neutral al-
ternatives “as they develop.”83  A logical consequence of this is that at 
some point, a university’s use of race will be very small but still consti-
tutional. 
Second, even modest use of race can facilitate the admission of 
students who add new perspectives and thus contribute to the educa-
tional benefits of diversity.84  This is the crux of the “unique contribu-
tion to diversity” test noted earlier85 and described in detail in my pri-
or Article.86  At the Fisher oral argument, Justice Alito noted that UT 
has “over 5,000 classes that qualified as small and the total number of 
African Americans and Hispanics who were admitted under [UT’s 
race-conscious policy] was just a little over 200,”87 and asked “how can 
that possibly do more than a tiny, tiny amount to increase classroom 
diversity.”88  Mr. Garre’s response focused on the “shocking isolation” 
of minority students in classes.89  But the educational benefits of di-
versity also occur outside classrooms.  There is far more student in-
teraction in campus dorms, student organizations, and in social 
events on campus than there is in the classroom.  A small number of 
minority students may readily form a student organization and spon-
 
 79 See id. at 23, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=1266/1341. 
 80 See id. 
 81 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (“[R]ace-conscious admissions policies 
must be limited in time. . . . In the context of higher education, the durational require-
ment can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic 
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student 
body diversity.”). 
 82 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 533–34. 
 83 539 U.S. at 342 (“Universities . . . can and should draw on the most promising aspects 
of . . . race-neutral alternatives as they develop.”). 
 84 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311, 532–33 (explaining how even a small number of 
minority students could have a meaningful impact on educational benefits of diversity). 
 85 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 86 See supra notes 69–73. 
 87 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 36–37, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=2149/2150. 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 37, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/
2012_11_345/argument?clip=2159/2175. 
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sor events related to diversity, thus educating the entire campus (or at 
least all students who are interested).  Although Mr. Garre noted that 
UT’s asserted compelling interest is not limited to classroom diversi-
ty, UT would have done better to emphasize and elaborate upon 
campus diversity and its educational benefits. 
Finally, it is impossible to eliminate the use of race altogether.90  
Even if UT’s race-conscious policy is struck down in Fisher, the Uni-
versity could still use race in the application process—albeit not as a 
box to be checked on the front of each application.  Chief Justice 
Roberts underscored the fact that “race is the only one of [UT’s] ho-
listic factors that appears on the cover of every application,”91 but this 
point is trivial, especially when the use of race is very modest, as it is 
in UT’s policy.92  Even if it is not on the front of the application, race 
may be discerned in other ways—via an applicant’s personal state-
ment, student group membership, and other sources on the applica-
tion,93 including names which are highly correlated with racial group 
membership.94  Larger scale use of race might be detectable statisti-
cally: for example, in both Regents of the University of California v. 
 
 90 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.311 (“There is no way to completely eliminate race 
from a holistic admissions process, as information about an applicant’s race may be pre-
sent throughout the application via personal statements, student group membership, and 
even names which are correlated with group membership.”).  See also infra notes 95, 100. 
 91 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 53, audio available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=3037/3059. 
 92 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304–05 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One can 
reasonably anticipate . . . that colleges and universities will seek to maintain their minority 
enrollment . . . whether or not they can do so in full candor through adoption of affirma-
tive action plans . . . . Without recourse to such plans, institutions of higher education 
may resort to camouflage.  For example, schools may encourage applicants to write of 
their cultural traditions in the essays they submit, or to indicate whether English is their 
second language.  Seeking to improve their chances for admission, applicants may high-
light the minority group associations to which they belong, or the Hispanic surnames of 
their mothers or grandparents.  In turn, teachers’ recommendations may emphasize who 
a student is as much as what he or she has accomplished. . . . If honesty is the best policy, 
surely Michigan’s accurately described, fully disclosed College affirmative action program 
is preferable to achieving similar numbers through winks, nods, and disguises.”); see also, 
e.g., Admissions, UC BERKELEY, http://admissions.berkeley.edu (last visited Feb. 14, 2013); 
The Personal Statement, UC BERKELEY, http://admissions.berkeley.edu/personalstatement 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2013) (application and personal statement weblinks for the Universi-
ty of California at Berkeley).  Prompt #1 for freshman applicants is “[d]escribe the world 
you come from—for example, your family, community or school—and tell us how your 
world has shaped your dreams and aspirations.”  Id.  Applicants can readily allude to their 
racial background in response to this prompt, and members of underrepresented minori-
ty groups can self-identify here. 
 94 See Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Steven D. Levitt, The Causes and Consequences of Distinctively Black 
Names, 119 Q. J. OF ECON. 767 (2004); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that without affirmative action, “applicants may highlight . . . Hispanic sur-
names”). 
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Bakke95 and Grutter v. Bollinger,96 the Plaintiffs submitted statistical evi-
dence of disparities in test scores between admitted minority and 
non-minority students.  However, no such evidence was presented in 
Fisher—possibly because race was such a small factor that such evi-
dence would not prove anything.  In fact, in their Supreme Court 
brief, the Fisher Plaintiffs themselves note that “UT is unable to identi-
fy any students who were ‘ultimately offered admission due to their 
race who would not have otherwise been offered admission.’”97 
Even if UT does not endorse such use of race, individual review-
ers—at least some of whom will be interested in increasing racial di-
versity among the undergraduate student body—will still be aware of 
applicants’ racial background and still be able to use this infor-
mation.98  Under Grutter, the use of race in holistic admissions is al-
ready required to be flexible and discretionary99: it is already up to 
individual reviewers whether to consider an applicant’s race and how 
much weight to give it.100  Even if it is not “on the cover of every appli-
 
 95 438 U.S. 265, 277 n.7 (comparing Plaintiff Alan Bakke’s GPA and MCAT scores with 
those of all applicants and of underrepresented minority applicants). 
 96 See Harpalani, supra note 4, at 528 n.289 (“The Grutter Plaintiffs used data on the under-
graduate GPAs and Law School Admissions Test (“LSAT”) scores of accepted and reject-
ed applicants to the University of Michigan School from 1995 to 2000, all sorted by race, 
and calculated the odds of acceptance for members of each group.  Part of the basis for 
their argument was that after statistically controlling for academic criteria and other vari-
ables, Black, Latino, and Native American applicants had a much higher probability of 
being accepted to the Law School than White and Asian American applicants.”). 
 97 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 77, at 38–39.  The Fisher Plaintiffs used this argument to 
bolster their claim that race had too small of an impact to be constitutional.  See supra 
notes 77–80 and accompanying text.  But see Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 
63, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-2019/2012/2012_11_345/
argument?clip=3591/3642 (Chief Justice Roberts asking the Solicitor General if he 
“agree[s] that [race] makes a difference in some cases,” to which the Solicitor General re-
sponded “[y]es, it does”). 
 98 See supra note 93; Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 
CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 1146 (2008) (raising “the question of whether race can in fact be 
eliminated from admissions processes”); Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institu-
tionalization of Affirmative Action as Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UW-
Madison, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 1015 (2007) (noting that “the line between race-
based and race-blind policy making can be quite blurry”). 
 99 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (“[T]he [University of Michigan] Law School 
engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious 
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse educational envi-
ronment.  The Law School affords this individualized consideration to applicants of all 
races.  There is no policy, either de jure or de facto, of automatic acceptance or rejection 
based on any single ‘soft’ variable.”). 
100 This point came up in oral arguments when Justice Scalia asked Mr. Verrilli that if two 
applicants “are identical in all other respects. . . . what does the racial preference mean if 
it doesn’t mean that in that situation the minority applicant wins and the other one los-
es?”  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 62.  Mr. Verrilli responded that 
“[t]here may not be a racial preference in that situation.  It’s going to depend on a holis-
 
Feb. 2013] FISHER’S FISHING EXPEDITION 71 
cation,”101 race might still be as much of a factor in UT admissions as 
it has been since 2004, when UT began its current race-conscious pol-
icy.102 
In fact, a similar issue arose in California, where the state constitu-
tion bans explicit consideration of race in public education.103  In Au-
gust 2008, Professor Tim Groseclose of the University of California at 
Los Angeles (UCLA) authored an 89-page report, in which he ac-
cused university admissions committee members of using applicant 
personal statements and other sources of information to give prefer-
ential treatment to minority applicants, specifically African Ameri-
cans, in spite of the California Constitution’s proscription.104  Others, 
such as anti-affirmative action organizer Ward Connerly, have also ac-
cused the UC system of using race informally.105 
The larger point is that as a practical matter, such minimal use of 
race is difficult to detect and prove in a holistic admissions system 
 
tic, individualized consideration of the applicant.”  Id.  Justice Kennedy seemed dismayed, 
stating that he “thought that the whole point is that sometimes race has to be a tie-
breaker . . . [and if] it isn’t. . . . then we should just say you can’t use race.”  Id.  Mr. Verril-
li responded that “[race] functions more subtly than that.”  Id. 
101 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
102 Of course, it may cost more for universities to review applications if race is not on the 
cover.  However, universities have adjusted to similar cost increases in the past.  See 
Harpalani, supra note 4, at 532 n.309 (“[C]olleges and universities have adjusted to simi-
lar circumstances in the past: after Grutter, institutions had to expend more resources on 
holistic admissions and eliminate more cost-effective point systems similar to the one 
struck down in Gratz.”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (“Respondents con-
tend that ‘[t]he volume of applications and the presentation of applicant information 
make it impractical for [the undergraduate college] to use the . . . admissions system’ up-
held by the Court today in Grutter . . . But the fact that the implementation of a program 
capable of providing individualized consideration might present administrative challeng-
es does not render constitutional an otherwise problematic system.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
103 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31(a) (“The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferen-
tial treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or na-
tional origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public con-
tracting.”). 
104 Tim Groseclose, Report on Suspected Malfeasance in UCLA Admissions and the Accompanying 
Cover-Up (Aug. 28, 2008), http://images.ocregister.com/newsimages/news/2008/
08/CUARSGrosecloseResignationReport.pdf.  One article on the UCLA controversy was 
entitled Is “Holistic” Admissions a Cover for Helping Black Applicants?  See Is “Holistic” Admis-
sions a Cover for Helping Black Applicants?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 2, 2008, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/09/02/ucla. 
105 Lipson, supra note 98, at 1015 (noting that “Ward Connerly . . . put forth and later par-
tially retracted accusations that the admissions officials at UC-Berkeley were ‘slipping’ 
race in through the back door via individual assessment (e.g., by preferring applicants 
from school districts that are predominantly African American or Hispanic, by preferring 
applicants with names that are predominantly African American or Hispanic, and/or by 
preferring applicants who identify or give clues that they are African American or Hispan-
ic in their personal statements”)). 
72 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY [Vol. 15 
with individualized consideration of applicants.106  There is no way to 
completely eliminate race from such a holistic admissions process, 
and the search for total race neutrality is another fishing expedition. 
Nevertheless, the Court is likely to rule against UT: the question is 
just how much it will limit the scope of race-conscious admissions.107  
One possibility is a narrow holding: the Court could rule simply that 
UT reached a “critical mass” (however that is defined) with the Top 
Ten Percent Law alone, or at least that it did not adequately demon-
strate the need for its race-conscious policy.  If this happens, it will 
limit UT’s use of race but leave Grutter largely in place for other uni-
versities.108  Alternatively, the Court could issue a broader ruling that 
 
106 This issue did not arise in Fisher and prior affirmative action cases because the institutions 
in question admitted that they used race intentionally in their admissions process.  But if 
race-conscious policies are formally struck down by the Court, this would not happen: use 
of race would not be formally sanctioned by the institutions.  In that case, Plaintiffs would 
have the higher burden of proving intentional use of race.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (noting that the Supreme Court has “not held that a law, neutral on 
its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid 
under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of 
one race than of another”); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) 
(holding that the Equal Protection Clause protects only against discrimination that oc-
curs “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group”). 
107 See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demograph-
ic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 113, 117 (2012) (noting that in Fisher, 
“the decisive vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy . . . likely will preclude repudiation of Grut-
ter’s central holding”); Allen Rostron, Affirmative Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of 
the Middle Ground, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 74, 78 (2012) (contending that in Fisher, 
“the most likely outcome is that Kennedy will . . . refus[e] to put a complete stop to af-
firmative action, but insist[] . . . that rigorous strict scrutiny really and truly will apply”); 
see also Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in Affirmative Action Cases? 
Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet) Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
EN BANC. 77, 88 (2012) (contending that “the most likely Fisher result” is one in which 
“[t]he window for race-based affirmative action in higher education will be narrowed, but 
left ever-so-slightly open” (footnote omitted)). 
  Nevertheless, there are a couple of possibilities for the Court upholding UT’s race-
conscious policy.  There is a slight chance that Justice Kennedy could vote to uphold UT’s 
race-conscious policy because it is so modest.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 
(2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional objection to the goal of con-
sidering race as one modest factor among many others to achieve diversity . . . .”); see also 
supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting how modest UT’s race-conscious policy is).  
However, this seems unlikely given Justice Kennedy’s consternation at UT’s focus on race.  
See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.  Additionally, there is a slight chance that 
Fisher could be dismissed by the Court on procedural grounds.  For arguments in favor of 
such dismissal, see Adam D. Chandler, How (Not) To Bring an Affirmative-Action Challenge, 
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 85 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/01/chandler.html. 
108 In response to Justice Stephen Breyer’s question about whether the Plaintiffs were asking 
the Justices to “overrule Grutter,” Mr. Rein stated that “we have said very carefully we were 
not trying to change the Court’s disposition of the issue in Grutter [that] there [could] 
be a . . . compelling interest . . . in using race to establish a diverse class.”  Transcript of 
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displaces critical mass and articulates a different standard for the 
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies.  For example, 
Fisher might preclude individualized consideration of race altogether 
but allow facially neutral policies which take racial demographics into 
consideration, such as the Top Ten Percent Law.109  If the Court does 
this, it will limit the scope of race-conscious admissions broadly, 
which would affect universities across the nation.  However, it will not 
be able to completely eliminate individualized consideration of race 
from the admissions process.  Universities may not be able to consid-
er race as a separate factor, but it will still enter the calculus through 
applicants’ personal statements and essays and the other sources not-
ed above.110  Moreover, while significant use of race could be detected 
statistically, application reviewers who are sympathetic will still be 
able to employ modest race consciousness in decision-making, even if 
this is not endorsed in university policy. 
Functionally, this may be no different from UT’s current, modest 
use of race in admissions: it will just add another dimension to the 
stealth that is inherent in holistic admissions.111  The entire Fisher case 
may just be a fishing expedition: a futile search for critical mass and 
total race neutrality in UT’s admissions system.  Nevertheless, if the 
ruling limits Grutter significantly, then Fisher’s fishing expedition 
might reel in race-conscious admissions at other universities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8, audio available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2012/2012_11_345/argument?clip=308/372. 
109 See Siegel, supra note 53, at 1308 (contending that Justice Kennedy is skeptical of individ-
ualized consideration of race but would uphold race-conscious but facially neutral poli-
cies if they serve a compelling interest). 
110 See supra notes 90–106 and accompanying text. 
111 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Uses of Ambivalence: Reflections on the Supreme Court and the Constitu-
tionality of Affirmative Action, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 907, 928 (1983) (“The indirectness of the 
less explicitly numerical systems may have significant advantages, not so much in terms of 
the processes of consideration as in the felt impact of their operation over time.  The de-
scription of race as simply ‘another factor’ among a lot of others considered in seeking 
diversity tends to minimize the sense that minority students are separate and different 
and the recipients of special dispensations; the use of more explicitly separate and struc-
tured systems might have the opposite effect.”). 
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